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I. Introduction
The Maryland v. Buie court established the principle of a protective sweep, which is a
sweep of a home incident to an arrest where “they have reasonable suspicion to believe the home
may harbor a dangerous third party.”1 Buie was decided solely in the arrest context, and there is
now a split among the circuit courts regarding the application of the protective sweep doctrine to
non-arrest contexts.2 The majority of circuit courts have concluded that Buie does extend to nonarrest contexts, specifically consent entries.3 The doctrine is abused in certain instances which
leads home owners to fear for the protection of their privacy interests.
This comment focuses on whether or not Buie can effectively be extended to situations
where officers have been given consent to enter the home, but not consent to search. Further,
does the Buie doctrine, as it stands, properly balance the private and governmental interests that
the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect? The circuit courts are divided between the view that
Buie applies when an objectively reasonable officer would have reason to be concerned for
safety and there are articulable facts in non-arrest contexts, and that Buie does not apply at all to
consent entries. I believe that the application of Buie to non-arrest, consent entry contexts can be
effective as long as the consent given for entry and the articulable facts given by the officer are
analyzed and justifiable to conduct a warrantless search.
I argue that Buie can effectively address non-arrest, consent to entry contexts. The Fourth
Amendment only bars unreasonable searches and seizures.4 I suggest that for the Buie doctrine
to apply to non-arrest, consent entry contexts without being potentially unreasonable, the courts
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must look to the scope of consent of the home owner as well as the actual articulable facts that
the officer gives to the court for justifying the warrantless search. It is important for homeowners
to know that the consent given for an officer’s entry is a limiting power that they possess. The
consent to entry is consent to one room, not the consent to a search of an entire home. This
consent analysis grants protection to the interests of the private home owner against the Buie
doctrine’s low burden of proof. In addition to emphasizing the consent to entry, the court must
analyze the articulable facts. This would ensure that officers are not merely listing off a set of
facts, but rather compiling facts that could justify a warrantless search in this context.
An example of the approach I emphasize is the recent decision by the United States
District Court of the Southern District of New York in United States v. Fadul. The case involved
officers entering an apartment based on consent to entry, but did not have a warrant to search.5
The officers believed, based on the occupants and their actions, that they needed to conduct a
protective sweep to ensure their safety in the apartment.6 The court was faced with whether or
not the officers were allowed to conduct a protective-sweep in this context.7 The basic principle
is that the Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”8 However, there are
justifications for warrantless searches that the courts have accepted in the warrantless search
context.9 Of relevant concern is a search of the private home where an individual gives consent
for entry, but the officers now wish to conduct a protective sweep. The Fadul court, after
analyzing the consent and the facts found that the officers did not have articulable facts to
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conduct the protective sweep.10 The Southern District of New York’s analysis is the proper
approach and should be utilized by the courts in Buie searches.
In Part II, I will provide the origin of the protective sweep doctrine and the definition of
consent. I will outline Maryland v. Buie’s creation of the doctrine and its application. In Part III,
I will provide an overview of the current United States Circuit Courts of Appeals split on the
protective sweep doctrine involving non-arrest cases. In Part IV, I will explain the Jimeno v.
Florida Supreme Court Decision, and how the consent definition from that case should be
applied in Buie analysis. In Part V, I will explain the police created exigency exception to the
Fourth Amendment that arose from Kentucky v. King and what it means in light of protective
sweep applications.
II. What is a Protective Sweep?
A. Maryland v. Buie and the Protective Sweep Doctrine
The Supreme Court embraced the “protective sweep” as a legitimate search in Maryland
v. Buie. The case involved the execution of an arrest warrant for Jerome Buie, at Buie’s home.11
Buie was found in the basement.12 After his arrest, an officer looked in the basement for other
individuals and found evidence tying Buie to the alleged crime.13 The issue before the Supreme
Court was the legality of the post-arrest search of the basement. The Buie court turned to Terry v.
Ohio and Michigan v. Long which rejected a probable cause standard “when there is a need for
law enforcement officers to protect themselves against violence in situations where they may
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lack probable cause for an arrest.14 Buie found that this similar interest in protecting officers was
to “assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is in, or has just been, is not harboring
other persons who are dangerous and who could expectedly launch an attack.”15
Buie’s facts emphasized officer safety in light of the risk of ambush and officer wellbeing.16 “The risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great, if not greater than,
as an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter.”17 A protective sweep is done to make
sure the officer is safe and to ensure a level playing field, since the officer is on the adversary’s
turf.18 The Court held that
as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces
immediately adjoining the place of [an] arrest from which an attack could be
immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts,
would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.19
The Court emphasized that a protective sweep is not a search of the full premises, but only to a
“cursory inspection of where a person may be found.”20 The sweep lasts no longer than is
necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to
complete the arrest and depart the premises.”21
Buie’s standard includes both an objective and subjective requirement.22 Thus, the
government needs to prove that (1) there is a reasonable belief a third party is present but also
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that (2) the searching officer actually possessed that belief.23 Further, the Buie test needs proof
that there is a reasonable suspicion that another person “(1) is present and (2) poses a danger.”24
However, a circuit split has developed as to whether or not the Buie test extends to non-arrest
contexts, specifically consent entries.
III. The Current Circuit Split
A.

Buie Approach Not Extended to Consent Entries

The Maryland v. Buie decision has led to a split among the circuit courts as to whether or
not the protective sweep doctrine can apply to the non-arrest, consent entry context. The first
position to emerge from the Buie decision was that the protective sweep doctrine does not apply
to non-arrest contexts. In United States v. Waldner, the Eighth Circuit declined to extend the
Buie approach for consent entries in the non-arrest context. The court analyzed a search
conducted pursuant to the enforcement of a protection order.25 Officers went to Waldner’s home
to execute the order, and Waldner answered the door.26 The officers explained that if Waldner
needed anything from the house, they would have to accompany him.27 Waldner agreed, which
led an officer to ask Waldner if anyone else was in the home or if there were any weapons, to
which Waldner replied no.28 The officers and Waldner went to the basement, where Waldner
wanted to obtain clothes.29 One officer followed Waldner and searched the room, finding neither
guns nor any other contraband.30 However, Waldner walked towards a room in the basement,
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Maren J. Messing, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Reaffirming a Limited Exception, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
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and the officers wanted to conduct a protective sweep of that room because Waldner was
standing near it.31 The officers found a gun cabinet that contained a rifle with a silencer on it.32
The court explained that Buie established a two prong test for a protective sweep.33 The
test allows for a protective sweep if: (1) incident to an arrest, officers may “search closets and
other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be
immediately launched”, and (2) the court “permitted a broader sweep when an officer possesses
a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”34 Further, Buie did not articulate
whether a protective sweep could permissibly be conducted for a search of weapons or
contraband.35 In this case, the officers conducted the search incident to serving a protective
order, a non-arrest situation.36 The Eighth Circuit explicitly stated that they would not extend
Buie to non-arrest situations.37 In the alternative, the court found that the officers lacked the
satisfying articulable facts required to justify a reasonable officer to have conducted a protective
sweep, thus missing the objective factor of Buie.38
Similarly to Waldner, the Tenth Circuit declined to extend the Buie doctrine to consent
entries. In United States v. Torres-Castro, Victor Torres-Castro was suspected of abusing his
fourteen-year-old girlfriend.39 The officers arrived at the home and saw the house was full of
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individuals, including Torres-Castro.40 When the officers were allowed to enter the home by
Torres-Castro, the officers felt compelled to conduct a protective sweep because the occupants
were spread throughout the home.41 The court found that expanding “the doctrine will encourage
law officers to gain legal entry through knock and talk requests and then gather evidence without
any requirement of suspicion or compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”42 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the protective sweep will not be extended to include non-arrest situations, such as
non-arrest consent entries.43
B.

Buie Applies to Non-Arrest, Consent Entries

The opposite side of the current circuit split is that the protective sweep doctrine should
be applied in consent entry scenarios. The first circuit court to rule that Buie applied to the
consent entry context was the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in 1992. In United States v. Patrick, Gary Patrick moved into Kevin Smith’s apartment
while Smith was hospitalized.44 Smith met with the police, since the officers wanted to
investigate the apartment, and signed a form authorizing the officers to search his apartment
within ten days, but the officers did not search the apartment until sixteen days later.45 Smith let
the officers in when they arrived.46 The officers saw four people in the living room, and noticed a
bedroom door open.47 The officers went back to that bedroom and found Patrick half on, half off
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the bed with his hand underneath the bed.48 The police saw in plain view money, a beeper, and a
clear plastic bag holding cocaine.49 The officers arrested Patrick upon finding the contraband.50
The D.C. Circuit Court began its analysis of the search by evaluating the protective
sweep conducted of Smith’s apartment. Patrick argued that he had an expected privacy within
the bedroom since Smith did not have the authority to give the officers consent to search his
room.51 The officers were lawfully on the premises, and convinced the court that the protective
sweep was proper because their reasonable belief was that the occupants were trafficking
narcotics and that their safety was at risk.52 The officers’ explanation of the articulable facts met
the objective and subjective requirements of Buie.53 Under the circumstances and absent the
warrant, the D.C. Circuit Court concluded that Buie extended to this type of search, absent a
warrant and the officers only had consent to enter the apartment.54 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit
allowed Buie to be applied in the non-arrest context.55
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard United States v.
Gould.56 On October 17, 2000, officers received a call warning that Kelly Gould had a plan to
kill two judges.57 The officers did not intend to arrest Gould when they visited his trailer, but to
talk to him.58 Another resident in the trailer consented to the officers’ entry into the trailer and
told the officers that Gould was in the back room.59 The bedroom door was open, and Gould was
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not readily visible.60 The officers then performed a sweep of the room to see if Gould was
hiding, where they found rifles in a closet.61 The officers later arrested Gould after asking him
who owned the rifles.62
The court endeavored to decide whether or not the protective sweep was appropriate in
this case. Buie emphasized the fact of the arrest but there is no limit that other circumstances
may not expose an officer
“to a comparable degree of danger . . . [that would] justify a similar protective
response (at least where those circumstances are not the product of police
illegality or misconduct) . . . [b]ut nothing in Buie suggests that the result would
have been different had the police otherwise properly entered the house as, for
example, pursuant to a proper consent rather than a warrant.”63
The “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed and the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the
house.”64
However, Buie makes “clear that the [protective sweep] does not preclude application in
the in-home sweep context of the general reasonableness standard calculated by balancing the
intrusion of Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests, includes those of officer safety.”65 Specifically, Gould found that an arrest does give
evidence of a danger to the officer, but the danger to officers may be established by other
circumstances.66 Therefore, the protective sweep doctrine should be applied in non-arrest
contexts determined by the particular facts of the case.
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The court further noted that the officers in this case were given consent to enter the trailer
when the occupant told the officers they were welcome to check out the bedroom.67 The court
found that the consent given was meant to include searching the bedroom to see if Gould was
there, and when they looked around the room for Gould, they then found the guns in the closet.68
This was a lawful entry for the trailer, further granting a search of the trailer to find Gould, but
not to search the bedroom. Thus, the consent here was acceptable for the entry and the articulable
facts were found to be satisfying, which permitted the officers to conduct the protective sweep.
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the
extension of Buie to consent entry cases in 2013.69 This case involved a robber attempting to
hold up a restaurant, and the robber was tracked by officers to an apartment after the attempted
robbery.70 The officers went to the apartment without an arrest or search warrant after viewing
the surveillance tape of the attempted robbery.71 The officers stated that they would return with a
warrant if the occupants did not open the door, which caused Holland to open the door.72
Holland was not the suspect, but was asked by the officers whether or not there was anyone else
in the apartment.73 Holland replied no, but then the officers heard rustling in a nearby room,
where they found the suspect attempting to hide while conducting a protective sweep.74 Holland
was arrested, and after the initial protective sweep, he signed a form consenting to an additional
search of the apartment.75
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Id. at 588.
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At trial, Holland argued that he had only given consent for the officers to enter the
apartment and that consent did not encompass a search of the bedroom.76 The court concluded
the consent given by Holland was valid in this case.77 The merits of Holland’s claim required
that the consent be voluntary; the government bears the burden of proving that consent was given
voluntarily.78 “Consent is voluntary if it is unequivocal, specific[,] and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.”79 The test is an objective one, and the court must
address “whether the totality of the circumstances establishes that the defendant permitted the
police inside.”80 The court must also consider the defendant’s “subjective understanding of his
constitutional right . . . the defendant’s personal characteristics, the length and nature of the
police – citizen interaction, and the use of police coercion, subtle or otherwise.”81
The court found the consent was valid in this context, and transitioned to the protective
sweep itself. “[W]e joined the majority of circuits in holding that the Buie protective sweep
doctrine extends to situations other than execution of arrest warrants.”82 Applying Taylor, the
court found that the officers were lawfully present through the consent of Holland, and that once
they heard noises from the bedroom the officers wanted to ensure their safety by checking the
bedroom.83 The entry to the bedroom was lawful based on these facts since it could lead an
objectively reasonable officer to believe there was the potential harm of ambush.84 Holland only
intended the consent to be limited to entering the apartment, but the court was convinced by the

Holland, 552 F. App’x at 269.
Holland, 552 F. App’x at 271.
78
Id. at 273-74.
79
Id. at 274.
80
Id. (See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227(1973)).
81
Id. (citing United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 174 (6th Cir. 2011)).
82
Holland, 552 F. App’x at 275.
83
Id. at 276.
84
Id. (See United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001)) (explaining that the protective sweep can be done in
non-arrest situations when looking at the totality of the circumstances, the officers also had probable cause to search
the apartment for the fear of someone hiding).
76
77

12

articulable facts that the protective sweep performed by the officers to ensure their safety
satisfied the Buie doctrine and met the requirements of reasonable suspicion.85
IV. Consent as a Limit to Help the Buie Doctrine
The circuit split above illustrates how law enforcement utilizes the protective sweep doctrine.
Officers utilize these searches often because police officers can list a few facts to satisfy the
reasonable suspicion for fear for their safety requirement under Buie.86 However, the potential
for abuse is present in protective sweeps, and to reduce the confusion for protective sweep
doctrines as exhibited in the current circuit split, the definition of consent should be emphasized
under Buie like the Florida v. Jimeno decision. Courts should give the consent of a private home
owner added emphasis because it serves as a line of defense to the officer’s ability to potentially
conduct a warrantless search in the individual’s home.
A. Florida v. Jimeno and the Emphasis of Consent
A. Florida v. Jimeno and the Definition of Consent in Search Contexts
The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether or not a search of a paper bag in
a car was permissible, when only consent to search the car was granted to a police officer.87 The
police officer believed Enio Jimeno, a suspected drug dealer, might be involved in drug
trafficking from a conversation he overheard.88 The officer, after pulling Jimeno over in a traffic
stop, asked Jimeno whether or not he could search the car under the belief that Jimeno was
carrying narcotics.89 Jimeno gave permission to Trujillo to search the vehicle.90
See generally Holland, 552 F. App’x 265.
See generally Torres, 470 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2006)
87
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 249-50.
85
86
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The officer eventually found a brown paper bag folded up in the car, which the officer
opened the bag and found a kilogram of cocaine.91 Jimeno believed that when he gave consent
to the officer only to search the vehicle, the consent given did not include opening the bag in the
car, even when the search is for narcotics.92 The Supreme Court found consent to search creates
a presumption that the officer’s search was reasonable in the first place.93 However, the
“standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
objective reasonableness – what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?”94
The scope of the search is limited to its expressed object.95 This case was simple for the
Court, Jimeno gave the officer permission to search the car.96 The officer searched the car
because he believed that Jimeno was in possession of narcotics.97 The Court found that the
consent given to the officer to search the car was objectively reasonable, such that the search for
containers in the car which may bear narcotics was consented to as well.98
The Court explained that a suspect may limit the consent for a search given to an officer,
but if consent “would be reasonably understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth
Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.”99 The Schneckloth
Court stated that “the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting
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search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of [a] crime, evidence that
may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.”100
Therefore, consent is limited to the objective reasonableness of what a typical reasonable person
would have understood by the exchange with the officer. On the other hand, an individual may
explicitly, or by what is reasonably implied by what the individual said, limit the consent given
to an officer.
B. Consent to Entry is Not Consent to Search
As the cases mentioned in the circuit split, there are situations where an officer conducts a
protective sweep after a consensual entry. The protective sweep doctrine is supposed to strike a
balance between an individual’s privacy right to their home and the government’s interests in
conducting searches and maintaining officer safety.101 When these courts expanded Buie to
included non-arrest consent entries, a danger emerged for the individual privacy rights to be
sacrificed for the sake of an officer’s reiteration of facts he believes created a danger to his wellbeing. This occurs frequently when the officer arrives at the scene with knowledge that the
suspect is potentially dangerous.102 However, the officers’ fear does not create consent to entry
or a consent to search. The home owner creates the consent for an officer’s entry, and that should
serve as a limit on the protective sweep doctrine unless additional consent is given.
Buie requires that the officer have reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a protective
sweep.103 Reasonable suspicion is less than a preponderance of the evidence.104 It’s less than the
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Id. at 252.
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requirement of probable cause that there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be
found.105 However, reasonable suspicion is more than just a hunch.106 The “Fourth Amendment
accordingly requires that police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an
investigatory stop.”107 Reasonable suspicion is a low standard which possibly allows an open
invitation for officers to gather whatever facts they can to justify the warrantless search.
The courts, in some instances, seem to have only required that officers reiterate a list of
facts to justify a search instead of analyzing the facts as to whether or not they justify a
protective sweep. For example, in United States v. Reid, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the
existence of consent to a search is not lightly to be inferred and the government bears the burden
of proof to establish the existence of effective consent.”108 Consent, like the definition in Jimeno
which applied to a consent to search, should be applicable in the consent entry context for a
protective sweep. This is because it fairly balances the interests of the government and the
homeowner.
William Ringel articulated that the
The sole authority to a search after a person has given consent derives from the
consent itself, the scope of the search must be limited strictly to the terms of the
consent. It is a suspect’s responsibility to limit the scope of a consensual search if
he or she so intends… Where an individual gives a general consent to a search, and
subsequently volunteers the information that evidence may be found within a
specific part of the search area, he or she indicates that a search of that area is within
the scope of the original consent.109
Ringel’s analysis of consent to searches reiterates the importance of an individual’s consent and
how a court should analyze a home owner’s consent. If an officer asks if they may come in, it
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Buie, 494 U.S. at 329.
Id.
107
United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990).
108
United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000).
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should be limited to the area where the individual rationally believed they limited the officer of
being in the home, except for the closets and areas where someone may be hiding as per the Buie
doctrine. Consent is then an implicit limit and not just a formality to obtain.
For example, an officer knocks on the door and asks the occupant if they may come in to
talk. If the individual says, “yes, come in,” that individual has created the scope of the entry with
their consent. The home owner creates the parameters for the officer’s entry to the initial room
he enters. The home owner has not said yes to a search, but only to the officer’s presence in the
home. That does not leave the officer without any tool to search since an officer may search the
room they’re permitted into as well as the closets adjoined to the room without having to ask for
permission or consent. However, if an officer believes he has a reasonable suspicion of danger,
because he was there to ask about an illegal gun charge, the officer may only justify a protective
sweep if there are articulable facts that would convince a court an actual belief of danger existed.
Buie and consent to search are two different justifications to conduct a warrantless search
for an officer. The consent to entry is not a form of warrantless search, and should not invite the
officer to feel they may search a home at first, especially under the Buie doctrine. In Gould, the
officers arrived at the trailer and asked for Gould because of a tip that Gould planned to harm
judges, in which an occupant said he’s in his room asleep, and let the officers in.110 The scope of
consent, which is what they rationally believed they were consenting to was to let the officers in
and go to the bedroom to find Gould. The officers went to the bedroom and did a protective
sweep where they checked places where someone could be hiding.111 The officers were enabled
to search the bedroom in case of danger under the Buie doctrine. However, the consent given to

110
111

United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 580-81.
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the officers was to go to the bedroom to find Gould. The officers did not go anywhere else
except where the occupant gave them permission. This is a simple example of how consent
operates within a Buie protective sweep.
However, a more complicated example would be United States v. Hassock. In this case,
the officers were allowed into the apartment by one of the occupants.112 The officers asked if
they may search around, and the occupant said yes.113 The occupant did not tell the officers they
may search every room in the house, but only to look around the room.114 The officers were not
given consent to enter the front bedroom, but argued that they were conducting a protective
sweep due to fear of danger of any possibility for an attack.115 The court concluded that the
protective sweep was not justified by the officers since they did not have articulable facts to
justify their suspicion of fear.116
The court should have utilized the Jimeno definition of consent, which would have
enabled the court to be able to ignore the sweep itself since the officers were only allowed to
enter the apartment, not enter the bedrooms of those that weren’t specifically given permission to
enter. It is not plausible to derive whether or not a homeowner consented to a search, only that
they allowed the officers into their home. The consent to entry allows Buie to operate (since
officers may search the adjoining areas to a room they’re let into) but limits an officer from
conducting an all-out search. A consent to entry is not a consent to search. The distinction above
would balance the interests of the government’s interests in searching and the right to privacy in
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one’s home. An individual allowing an officer to come into the home should not be an open door
for an officer to search the entire house.
The definition of consent given for consent entries serves as a stronger alternative than
what has been already suggested. Maren J. Messing suggested that protective sweeps should
exclude consent entries.117 Messing’s concern is that police obtain free reign once consent is
given for entry.118 Messing believed that law enforcement’s articulable facts to justify the sweep
must be scrutinized and analyzed by the court.119 Her solution creates an issue of limiting
protective sweeps to only certain situations. This method would eliminate protective sweeps in
non-arrest contexts which is too drastic of a solution and harms the government’s interests.
Similarly, Leslie O’Brien suggests that consent entries should not fall under the purview
of the protective sweep doctrine.120 O’Brien seems to be concerned that a consent entry in nonarrest situations will only be a fact gathering opportunity for the officer.121 The solution is
consent entries be excluded and the officer is required to have knowledge that the home owner is
suspected to have committed an inherently dangerous crime.122 This would lead consent entries
to be obsolete in this context. Both authors have found that the consent to entry context is too
easily abused by officers to conduct warrantless searches.
The consent analysis with actual analysis of articulable facts approach would limit
officers to a reasonable degree without eliminating the tool for officers in the consent context
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like Messing and O’Brien have suggested. Officers should not lose the Buie doctrine because
they entered a home pursuant to a consent to entry and without a search warrant. Officers, under
Buie, may check the adjoined closets for their safety, but beyond that they are limited to that
room. The consent given limits officers since they may not expand their search of the consented
entry unless they can provide articulable facts as to fear of an ambush from another occupant,
satisfying both the objective and subjective requirements of Buie. However, as O’Brien has
suggested as well, the courts should additionally challenge the officer’s articulable facts to
ensure that it justifies the warrantless search conducted.123
When a reasonable person has given consent to an officer for entry, all the officer may do
is enter the home. The reasonable consent, described in Jimeno, is only for the officer to enter the
doorway to the home, not a search. It would be prima facie unreasonable for an officer to begin a
warrantless search of the home unless they can state facts that justify it. As said by the Supreme
Court, the cornerstone of the Buie doctrine is reasonableness.124 When opening the door, an
individual may allow an officer to either enter the home or not. They have a choice in giving
consent. However, once law enforcement in the home, as Buie suggests, facts may arise that will
allow officers to conduct a protective sweep.125 Regardless of whether or not there is skepticism
about an officer’s intent of entering the home, there still needs to be the balance between
government and privacy rights. O’Brien and Messing found that consent entries are an open
ground for officers to abuse the protective sweep doctrine. However, their solutions almost
eliminate the protection granted by the protective sweep doctrine to officers. If the officer
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receives a limited consent to entry, and have already checked the adjoined areas of the room,
then the Buie doctrine is satisfied and the home owner’s private interests.
In United States v. Fadul, Messing’s and O’Brien’s fear of officers abusing the protective
sweep doctrine in non-arrest, consent entry contexts are emphasized between the officers
arriving to investigate marijuana usage, and then possible facts leading to why the officers went
to the back bedroom and conducted a protective sweep. In Fadul, officers received a civilian
complaint about marijuana usage in an apartment.126 What occurred in the apartment, after the
complaint was received by the officers, was heavily disputed by the New York City Police
Department.127 According to the officers, they were given consent to enter the apartment by an
occupant.128
Once the officers were in the apartment, a child left the living room and went down the
hallway.129 Detective Smyth, one of the officers, told the child to halt but the child continued
down the hall.130 With these facts, the officers decided to conduct a protective sweep of the
apartment.131 The officers searched the bathroom and then the three bedrooms of the
apartment.132 After conducting a protective sweep, the officers found a gun and drug
paraphernalia.133
The court stated that “even considered together, the smell of marijuana, the number of
civilians present, and presence of another person (whether taking a shower or otherwise) does
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not even come close to justifying a protective sweep.”134 The Fadul court aggressively analyzed
the officers shared belief of fear or danger. The court found that the officer’s fears had no
specific facts to support the officers’ belief that the individuals posted a danger to their safety
according to the Buie test.135 Further, the consent to entry given to the officers should concern
courts since it encourages obtaining “consent as a pretext for conducting a warrantless search and
undermine the well-established principle that a person can limit the scope of his or her consent to
search to a particular area.”136
Fadul shows the power of consent as well as the issues surrounding protective sweeps in
consent entries. The conclusion reached by the Fadul court is exactly the analysis that courts
should apply when determining whether a proper protective sweep was properly executed. The
Court aggressively went through the facts given by the officer that the officers argued justified
the warrantless search. Further, the apartment occupant’s consent was analyzed by the based on
the facts given at trial. Thus, Fadul is a prime example of a proper protective sweep analysis in a
conducted appropriately in a non-arrest, consent entry context.
If an individual consents to an officer to enter the home, the person reasonably expects
the officers to simply enter the home, nothing more. However, the officers can expand from that
area to other areas of the home if there are articulable facts that would lead a court to actually
believe that an officer had a reasonable suspicion of danger. If the court analyzes the consent and
the facts similarly to how the Fadul court did, Messing’s and O’Brien’s concerns are eliminated.
It is important for individual home owners to understand that their consent to the officer’s entry
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is a limiting factor for officers. When a homeowner opens the door and tells the officer they may
come in, it’s reasonable to believe they only meant one room and not a search of the entire home.
V. An Alternative for Officers, the Police-Created Exigency Doctrine
A. Kentucky v. King
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there should be other methods for an officer
to conduct a warrantless search when entering an individual’s home. In 2011, the Supreme Court
decided the police created exigency method for warrantless searches was constitutional
depending on the specific facts of the case.137 Officers followed an individual, who they believed
to be a drug dealer, to an apartment complex in Lexington, Kentucky.138 Undercover Officer
Gibbons saw the deal take place and radioed uniformed officers to move in on the suspect.139
The officers ran into the breezeway between the apartments, and heard a door shut, as well as the
strong odor of burnt marijuana.140 Even though Gibbons radioed the warning that the suspect
went into the apartment on the right, the officers did not hear this and went to the apartment on
the left based on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from that door.141 Officer Steven Cobb
knocked on the door and yelled that the police were at the door.142 The officers heard people
moving inside and believed the people were moving potential evidence inside.143
The officers believed that the drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed, which led
Cobb to kick down the door and enter the front room of the apartment.144 The officers found
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Hollis King and two others smoking marijuana.145 The officers conducted a protective sweep of
the apartment and found marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view.146 The officers eventually
entered the apartment on the right, and found their suspected drug dealer.147
The issue before the court was whether the officers impermissibly created the exigent
circumstances when they entered King’s apartment.148 The Court recognized that “the exigencies
of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”149 The Court reiterated usual exceptions,
one being to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.150 However, this Court has adopted
the police-created exigency doctrine, which states officers cannot merely “rely on the need to
prevent destruction of evidence when the exigency was created or manufactured by the conduct
of the police.”151 Rather, courts require more than just a fear of detection by the police to have
caused the destruction of evidence.152
The Court stated that applicable test is whether or not the exigent circumstances justify a
warrantless search “when the conduct of the police [,] preceding the exigency [,] is reasonable
…”153 The Supreme Court further emphasized that officers may ask to enter a home if they are
lawfully on the premises in the first place.154 “If the consent is freely given, it makes no
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difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or expectation of
obtaining consent.”155
The Court concluded that the above test is what the lower courts shall enforce when an
officer creates the exigent circumstances.156 This test is based on objective factors, because law
enforcement is best achieved by objectiveness versus subjective factors.157 This allows
reasonableness to be the determining factor of a search versus solely what that officer would
have done in that situation. Further, citizens are able to refuse speaking with a police officer
when the officer does not have a warrant.158 Justice Sutton stated:
When the police knock on a door, but the occupants choose not to respond or to
speak, “the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low point,” and the
occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security
system cannot provide.159
Occupants that elect to try and destroy evidence have only “themselves to blame for the
warrantless exigent circumstances search that may ensue.”160 Therefore, the Supreme Court
adopted the police-created exigency test which grants officers a tool to conduct searches when
there is no warrant to conduct the search in the first place, but requires more than just reasonable
suspicion and a list of facts.161
B. Police Created Exigencies Grants Officers an Alternative Method of Warrantless Searches
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The Buie doctrine applies when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that they’re in harm
from ambush in the home. If an officer fails to satisfy the burden of proof under the Buie
doctrine, the sensible alternative for an officer would be to use the police-created exigency
doctrine. Buie is limited to one possible scenario while the King doctrine encompasses different
scenarios that fall under the category of police-created exigencies. The King doctrine requires
probable cause, which is a higher standard to meet for officers than Buie. However, the emphasis
is on the facts of a case and whether or not an officer has an even stronger belief that their wellbeing, evidence, or other circumstances are in danger.162
The King court noted that consent-based entries create lawful presence in the home, “it
makes no difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or expectation
of obtaining consent.”163 Thus, warrantless searches are permissible when the circumstances
make it reasonable to do so as long as the officer did not engage or threat to engage in Fourth
Amendment violations.164 The test is an objective one, and must be viewed from what a
reasonably objective officer would have done with the same factual scenario.165
King finds police-created exigencies permissible as long as they are objectively
reasonable.166 For example, the officer knocks on the door and is allowed to enter the apartment.
The officer realizes that there is a ton of noise in the back room. The officer could reasonably
believe something suspicious is going on based upon the officer’s arrival. Further, now the
officer may believe he is in serious danger of a significant injury and should conduct a search
under the King doctrine. Alternatively, if an officer wanted to utilize Buie to justify the search, it
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would be more difficult because the standard is applied only to a narrow case to justify the
search. However, King causes an officer need to have a stronger sense of reason compared to
Buie’s reasonable suspicion standard as explained by the Supreme Court.
The goal in Buie was to limit officers who want to conduct a protective sweep of the
home when they do not have a reasonable belief their safety may be jeopardized by ambush of
someone in hiding.167 The Buie and King doctrines both focus on reasonableness, however King
is distinguishable from Buie. King specifically finds that officers have a substantial interest in the
preservation of evidence and other exigencies like officer safety.168 King implies that when
police announce their presence or are seen, individuals may act in a way that requires an officer
to conduct a search without a warrant only after some event or suspicion arises.169 King does not
face the consent to entry issues that Buie can suffer from, but requires a more rigorous, higher
standard of analysis to justify the officer’s search.
Buie’s standard is severely limited to situations where an officer can articulate that there
was a belief that his safety is in jeopardy based on articulable facts. The King doctrine is based
on searches after exigencies occur when the officer is lawfully present in the home by consent.
The warrantless search is permissible only if an objectively reasonable officer believed a police
created exigency existed or they are in danger of significant harm.170 King is limited to the
notable exigencies the courts have recognized, but provides a strong balance of government and
private interests under the Fourth Amendment because it does not allow officers to have reign in
the home unless something occurs to warrant such a search, similarly to Buie.171
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A side by side of the two doctrines creates an impression that King grants a wider latitude
to officers to conduct a warrantless search. King allows a search once something occurs which
makes an officer has probable cause that evidence is in jeopardy based upon their presence, or
other exigencies recognized by the court. Buie focuses solely on officer safety, which would
limit an officer in searching the rest of the home. Buie operates more effectively when an arrest
warrant is present because it grants the officer the reasonable fear of harm present already
because they are there to make an arrest of a suspected dangerous person. However, if Buie is
utilized as the Fadul court has, it may be the more preferred option in the non-arrest, consent
entry context.
If Buie is applied as it is now, officers have ample opportunity to abuse the protective
sweep doctrine. The police-created exigency doctrine allows officers an alternative method to
satisfy a warrantless search based upon their lawful presence, and offers a wider array of
scenarios to conduct these searches. Buie is a limited doctrine as explained above, but if the
doctrine is analyzed similarly to the Fadul court’s method, Buie is an exceptional tool for
officers. Both doctrines are extremely fact sensitive, but Buie has been utilized by officers in the
non-arrest consent entry context, creating a divide among the circuit courts. Officer should not be
left without alternatives to conduct warrantless searches since the private home can be a
dangerous environment, but Buie can accurately satisfy both the state and private home owner if
applied as suggested above. Buie is a strong doctrine if properly applied in the non-arrest,
consent entry context because it effectively weighs the home owners and the government’s
interest. If Buie does not serve the officer in a given case, the officer is not left without recourse
to ensure their safety.
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VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court decided in Maryland v. Buie to create the protective sweep doctrine,
which allows officers to conduct a warrantless search beyond the area the officers have
entered.172 Buie originally extended only to arrest contexts, but the circuit courts are now split as
to whether or not Buie should apply to non-arrest, consent. I have suggested consent to entry
should be analyzed similarly to how the Jimeno court analyzed the scope of consent given to an
officer. The court must partake in an analysis of both the consent given by the home owner as
well as the officer’s articulable facts justifying the warrantless search.
There is an evident danger that officers may manipulate fact situations as to justify the
protective sweep. The consent of an individual to an officer’s entry accounts for both parties’
interests. Home occupants will usually not announce the limits as to where an officer may go to
in the home once consent is given. However, there should be a reasonable expectation that
consent to entry given to an officer in a non-arrest context would lead an officer would
understand that they are permitted only through the doorway of the home. In the alternative, if an
officer cannot satisfy the narrow standard set forth under Buie, the Kentucky v. King doctrine
grants an officer another tool to conduct warrantless searches in the consent entry context.
Kentucky v. King allows officers to conduct searches when a possible exigency is created due to
police presence without a warrant. King is a heightened standard with different justifications to
conduct the search. An officer must not be defenseless when conducting a knock and talk, but
they should not have free reign as well. An officer that fails to satisfy Buie may have a secondary
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opportunity to conduct a warrantless search if a police created exigency occurs after they are
lawfully on the property by consent or by warrant.
The Fourth Amendment focuses on reasonable searches. The Buie doctrine should apply
to non-arrest contexts, specifically consent entries. The consent to entry is not the consent to a
search. With the emphasis focused on what the occupant’s reasonable expectation as to the
consent given, other doors become tougher to search for officers. However, officers have the
ability to ensure their safety, but not at the sacrifice of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Officers aren’t left without avenues to search because the police created exigency doctrine grants
officers an alternative if they are not able to meet the Buie doctrine. King offers a different set of
circumstances where an officer may conduct a warrantless search (including officer safety). In
conclusion, the Buie doctrine is still an effective tool in the non-arrest, consent entry context as
long as the courts endeavor to analyze the consent for entry as well as the articulable facts
offered to justify the warrantless search. Officers should not be left without an ability to conduct
these searches, but the consent to entry is not consent to violate a home owner’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
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